Where relatives compete for the same resources (kin competition) and each obtains an equal share, this can favour the evolution of elevated dispersal rates, such that most resource competition is among nonrelatives. We show that this effect evaporates as among-sibling dominance increases to the point where the allocation of resources is maximally unequal. We restore a kin-competition effect on emigration rates from dominance-ranked family groups by showing that where siblings form queues to inherit the breeding positions, the length of the queue affects the fitness of all individuals by depreciating the rank of subsequent offspring. Incorporating this 'offspring depreciation' effect decreases optimal queue lengths, increases dispersal rates and explains the otherwise paradoxical use of sinks by cooperatively breeding birds in stable environments. The offspring depreciation effect also favours the evolution of small, but consistent, clutch sizes and high reproductive skew, but constrains the evolution of alloparenting.
INTRODUCTION
Dispersal, the one-way movement of individuals, is central to the ecology and evolution of species because it determines their distribution in both space and time (Dieckmann et al. 1999) . At a mechanistic level of explanation, dispersal is so important because it determines the manner in which available resources are exploited. It follows directly from this that understanding dispersal is key to the study of population ecology because resource usage determines population size. More generally, dispersal is a defining process in the evolution of social complexity. In many species, the aim of dispersal is to get away from conspecifics, in order to avoid competition. We consider social organisms to be those that congregate to a greater extent than the available resource distributions suggest is necessary. We favour this restricted definition of sociality because the alternative, whereby all congregations are social groups, both renders the 'social' redundant and robs us of a term to describe species that actively congregate.
In general, dispersal is assumed to depend on a range of factors, including the quality and temporal heterogeneity of available sites, negative and positive density dependence, dispersal mortality, dominance and inbreeding (Dieckmann et al. 1999) . These factors affect dispersal because of their consequences for direct fitness, i.e. the component of inclusive fitness that is independent of any consequences dispersal may have for one's relatives' fitnesses. In addition, indirect fitness effects (those dependent on relatives) can either increase or decrease dispersal rates, depending upon whether congregating with relatives helps (kin altruism) or harms (kin competition) these individuals. There is substantial literature on both the effects of kin altruism in general (reviewed in Cockburn 1998; Clutton-Brock 2002) and the dispersal effects of kin com-petition where each relative gains an equal share of resources (scramble competition). This leaves the notable omission of the effects of kin competition where relatives do not get an equal share of resources (contest competition). The most unequal conceivable division of resources results when the first individual takes as much of the resource as they wish, the second all they want of the remainder, and so on. Whilst such strict queues are probably rare, among kin groups there are many instances of queues for breeding vacancies that approximate to them (Poiani 1994) . In some groups just one male and female breed, while offspring of both sexes queue, examples being sciurids (Blumstein & Armitage 1998) , wrens (Rabenold 1990; Haydock et al. 1996) , jays (Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1984; Ekman et al. 2001 ) and woodpeckers (Stacey & Ligon 1987; Walters et al. 1992) . Female-only queues exist in wasps (Cant & Field 2001) , whilst groupliving species with male-only queues are also common (reviewed in East & Hofer 2001; Faulkes & Bennett 2001) . The existence of reproductive suppression and asymmetric contests for local breeding positions might even be considered diagnostic of sedentary social groups (Kokko & Johnstone 1999) .
Briefly, dispersal determines resource use, and resource use both diagnoses social complexity and underpins population ecology. Kin competition can affect dispersal, but to date this has only been investigated in scramble-competition systems. This, together with the widespread incidence of family groups with queues for breeding positions, makes a pressing case for developing our understanding of kin competition in these groups. We first establish an empirical case for the importance of kin competition for natal dispersal from family groups. We then develop a model to explain the evolution of dispersal in species with a strict queue for local breeding vacancies. In order to do this, we first take a step back and show that in the simplest version of the model the assumption of a strict queue does not lead to kin-competition-induced elevation of natal dis- Stacey & Ligon (1987) persal rates. We then add the key observation that kin competition arises in queuing systems because existing offspring depreciate the rank of future offspring. A model incorporating this 'offspring depreciation' effect restores selection for elevated dispersal rates.
EVIDENCE FOR AND MODELS OF KIN COMPETITION
Before developing our model, we briefly review the empirical support for the notion that kin competition plays a part in the dispersal strategies of species with queuebased groups. Most obviously, there are reports of open aggression among kin (Mumme et al. 1983; Hoogland 1985; Strickland 1991) . Additionally, many queuing species conform to the prediction of Hamilton & May (1977) that kin competition should produce a dimorphic dispersal pattern among offspring, with the added qualification that retained offspring have far better prospects than their dispersing siblings do. Specifically, in a range of queuing species, offspring that delay dispersal and wait on their natal territory either gain better quality territories or are more likely to breed than their siblings that disperse as juveniles (Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1984; Strickland 1991; Walters et al. 1992; Ekman et al. 2001; Green & Cockburn 2001; Komdeur & Edelaar 2001) . Finally, we have reviewed studies that measure bird survivorship and fecundity across a range of habitats, and all the studies reveal that individuals using the poorest measured habitats have lifetime fitnesses of less than one (table 1) . This use of sink habitats in stable environments implies the existence of kin competition because dispersal to sink habitats is maladaptive unless there is a concomitant kin-selected benefit (Lambin et al. 2001 ).
Given the above evidence for the widespread incidence of territorial family-based groups in which some offspring delay dispersal and queue for breeding positions, we now focus on modelling such a life history. We assume only the dominant pair breed, non-relatives cannot join queues and only one sex has the option of queuing, and we focus on inheritance queues. Although sometimes both sexes queue, and sometimes offspring queue for vacancies on neighbouring territories (Zack & Stutchbury 1992) , the evolutionary dynamics of such systems will be qualitatively similar to the pure inheritance system we analyse. This follows from the fact that where subordinates queue for vacancies on more than one territory, they will have to compete with proportionally more individuals. Consequently, the chance of obtaining a breeding vacancy is similar whether individuals have exclusive access to a sinProc. R. Soc. Lond. B (2002) gle vacancy or a shared prerogative to several neighbouring territories.
First, we calculate a breeder's (alpha's) fitness. For a constant annual survival probability L, the probability of being alive i years from the present is L i . Accordingly, where annual production of same-sex offspring is M, reproductive success in year i is ML i , and, thus, the lifetime reproductive success of an alpha ( 1 ) can be estimated as
The lifetime reproductive success of a subordinate queuing to inherit its natal territory can be similarly estimated. As we are considering strict queues, a subordinate only obtains any reproductive success once it has become a breeder. The probability that an individual is breeding in year i is the probability that it is alive, multiplied by the probability that it could have inherited, i.e. that the existing breeder and all higher queuers have died. The probability that an individual is dead by year i is (1 Ϫ L i ); thus, if the alpha's rank is 1 and the queuer's rank is k, the probability one could have inherited is
See Kokko & Johnstone (1999) for an alternative derivation of 2 .
(a) Model 1: kin competition among current offspring A potential disperser will be twice as related to itself as to its parents or other queuing siblings, meaning the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) will depend on whose perspective it is analysed from. However, as we are primarily interested in whether kin competition elevates dispersal rates in family groups, and not in any conflicts of interest among kin over the magnitude of dispersal rates, we examine the simplest inclusive fitness perspective: that of an alpha, with equal relatedness to all queuers. As we assume the number of queuers has no influence on the reproductive success of the breeder (M is constant), an alpha maximizes her fitness by simply maximizing the sum of her offsprings' direct fitnesses. For a group with an alpha and Q queuers this is
The direct fitness ESS, for a species with strict queues for breeding positions, is for subordinates to disperse if their lifetime reproductive success through queueing ( k ) is less than one (Kokko & Sutherland 1998) . That is, at equilibrium, all vacancies worth more than one will be filled, and thus the best vacancy available will offer a lifetime reproductive success ( s ) of less than one. Hence, if kin competition is to elevate dispersal rates, it must be advantageous for an individual to sacrifice a queuing opportunity offering a lifetime reproductive success of one or more for a breeding vacancy worth s . First, we consider dispersal by the lowest queuer. If they disperse, none of their superiors' inheritance prospects will change, so the alpha's indirect fitness becomes
where Ј is necessarily lower than , because we have defined Qϩ1 to be more than s as our starting condition; so adding inclusive fitness in this instance does not change the alpha's ESS. However, if a higher queuer were to leave, then all its lower ranking subordinates would rise in rank. At first glance, this will increase Ј relative to , and thus produce shorter evolutionarily stable queues. However, irrespective of which queuer leaves, because all lower queuers will move up a rank, the result will be that Ј will remain exactly as it would if the lowest queuer left. Briefly, and in contrast to the cases with scramble competition analysed by Hamilton & May (1977) , Irwin & Taylor (2000) and Ronce et al. (2000) , where there is contest competition for resources, i.e. a strict queue, kin competition does not elevate dispersal rates relative to the direct fitness ESS. Therefore, although we have empirical evidence for kin competition, we appear to lack a satisfying underlying mechanism.
(b) Model 2: kin competition between current and future offspring The paradoxical conclusion that where dominance is high the number of relatives waiting to breed appears to have little kin-competition effect may be resolved by considering the situation not among siblings but from the perspective of an alpha. An alpha with a shorter queue would clearly have a higher residual reproductive value, as, whenever there are some queuing benefits available, having mature subordinates will reduce the value of these benefits to future offspring. Accordingly, from the point of view of the alpha (and, to a lesser extent, that of the current offspring), the direct fitness evolutionarily stable dispersal rates will be too low; but, if too many offspring disperse early, there is a risk that none are available to inherit. We therefore analysed this trade-off.
We again wish to optimize queue lengths from the alpha's perspective. To estimate the direct fitness of an alpha with Q queuing subordinates, we note that using lifetime reproductive success to measure fitness makes the simplifying assumption that all offspring are of equal worth. Accordingly, we introduce an 'offspring depreciation' weighting, O Q , to account for the prospects of offspring born to an alpha with queue length Q, such that To calculate O Q we make the simplifying assumption that current queue lengths are exactly representative of future lengths, and ignore the fact that environmental and demographic stochasticity will mean that queue lengths fluctuate from year to year. This means, for instance, that if an alpha is deciding whether to tolerate a second queuer, it is choosing between always having a queue length of two and always having a queue length of one. It is necessary to make some such assumption about future queue lengths to avoid a paradox, which we can most easily illustrate by an alpha that chose to evict a single queuer, in order to improve the queuing prospects of future offspring. Such an alpha would presumably also choose to evict these future potential queuers on the same basis, and so none would ever actually accrue any queuing benefits.
The assumption that queues are temporally invariant means that each year the number of births must equal the combined number of deaths and dispersals to sinks, D s , i.e.
Thus, for an alpha with Q subordinates, future offspring will have the following fitness:
From equation (2.5) figure 1a ). This is consistent with the phylogenetic pattern (Arnold & Owens 1998 ) that longevity favours sociality. While such a simple approach omits the bulk of the ecology, we emphasize the comparative utility of the queue lengths produced. Accordingly, we include figure 1b, which shows the queue lengths for an ideal free distribution model without kin competition (Kokko & Sutherland 1998) . One way of interpreting the continuum between these models is to note that as s tends to zero, figure 1a converges on figure 1b. Whilst the forms of the relationships in figure 1 are the same, the queue lengths are very different, indicating the extent to which offspring depreciation can inflate dispersal rates. Further, the relatively shortened queues depend on the use of sink habitats in a stable environment. This indicates that, in accordance with reported patterns (table 1) , where there are strict dominance hierarchies, such behaviour can be adaptive.
DISCUSSION
We have considered social groups in which subordinates queue to inherit breeding vacancies, and shown that sibling competition elevates dispersal rates, relative to a direct fitness ESS, only where there is scramble competition. We believe that this result can be extended to any dominancebased competition for resources. As such, kin-competition Kokko & Sutherland (1998) ). Contrasting the two indicates the striking potential for kin competition to reduce queue lengths, especially where M and L are large. The general forms of the relationships illustrated are the same in both (a) and (b). By tracing the equilibrium queue lengths as L increases for constant M, and vice versa, it can be seen that queue lengths increase with both longevity and fecundity. models will only be valid for the mode of competition they assume. In our second model, we show that the depreciative effect of retained offspring on the rank of future offspring is an additional route by which kin competition can elevate dispersal rates. The converse of such elevated dispersal is smaller social groups. Accordingly, it is necessary to be careful when extrapolating, from models that restrict queues to a single subordinate, to the evolution of sociality in general (Pen & Weissing 2000) .
We focus on strict queues; however, for many species dominance is less ordered (Poiani 1994) . Whilst this will reduce the depreciative effect of current offspring on future offspring, it will elevate the importance of competition among current offspring. As among-sibling dominance increases, a switch in importance from conventional kin competition to conflict between current and future offspring will be a general phenomenon. To what extent this will result in constancy of combined kin-competition effects as dominance changes remains to be determined. In this context, it is interesting to note that, whilst the effects of among-sibling competition on dispersal drop to zero as competition moves from scramble to contest, the converse is not true of competition between current and future offspring. Even with scramble competition, an alpha's residual reproductive value will be reduced by resident offspring. Other processes that will mitigate the importance of kin competition include senescence and positive density dependence (also known as Allee effects). Senescence reduces a future offspring's quality relative to that of current offspring, while Allee effects will result in a trade-off, such that a longer queue will mean more future offspring but of a lower reproductive value.
For the remainder of this discussion we consider how offspring depreciation develops existing perspectives on optimal reproductive strategies. The model presented here has a close parallel with brood-reduction strategies. The breeders' main goal is to maintain a queue of individuals sufficient to fill local vacancies, while surplus offspring are evicted to poor territories. This dimorphism has the effect of magnifying the decline in offspring fitness with rank, relative to an already steep fall-off indicated by equation (2.2). This exceptionally steep decline provides a single unifying mechanism to explain several reproductive strategies seen in social groups. These include clutch size, reproductive skew and parental care, each of which we consider in turn.
First, clutch sizes: an exaggerated decline in fitness with rank means that producing small but consistent clutches significantly increases the breeder's fitness through minimizing the number of offspring evicted. This means that, where queuing evolves, there will be a concomitant selection pressure for producing clutches that are uniformly small. Consistent with this, many species with delayed dispersal produce small clutches (Arnold & Owens 1998; Blumstein & Armitage 1998) , with helpers serving to reduce the variation in offspring production (Magrath 2001) . Similarly, where only one sex queues, there will be selection to bias sex ratios to the non-queuing sex once the evolutionarily stable queue length is reached.
Second this rank-fitness effect will also magnify levels of female reproductive skew. In general, a decline in offspring fitness with brood size increases reproductive skew because the fitness gains of producing extra offspring become progressively smaller (Cant 1998 ). The extremely poor prospects for the lower subordinates that kin competition produces lead to a concave negative relationship between rank and fitness, which will magnify this effect. High reproductive skew is consistent with recent maternity analyses of group-living species (Haig et al. 1994; Haydock et al. 1996; Cockburn 1998; Goldstein et al. 1998; Richardson et al. 2001; Faulkes & Bennett 2001) .
This perspective on reproductive skew could also explain the menopause. Kokko & Johnstone (1999) found that where subordinate-fighting ability is high, relative to the current dominant, a role swap is predicted. The senescence process and the relative longevity of humans predispose them to such intergenerational swaps. In addition, as other primate societies have male-only queues (Faulkes & Bennett 2001) , it is possible that the right of primogeniture (whereby the eldest surviving male inherits all) has deep phylogenetic roots. Given the prospect of both offspring depreciation and parent-offspring dominance reversals, the menopause could have evolved to pre-vent a demoted parent threatening to depreciate the offspring of the newly promoted first queuer.
A third and final implication of offspring depreciation for reproductive strategies is that it may explain the relative ubiquity of biparental care (87%-92% of birds; Reynolds et al. (2002) ), relative to cooperative breeding (3.2% of birds; Arnold & Owens (1998) ). As offspring are equally related to their own and their parents' offspring, there is no general reason why they should prefer independent breeding to helping. Together with the analysis of Cockburn (1996) , this suggests that it is the rarity, as opposed to the incidence of helping, that requires an explanation. In an obligate biparental-care system, a father is not in competition with his offspring for breeding vacancies, and thus does not have a kin-competition cost to count against his kin-altruistic parenting. By contrast, a helping offspring incurs a kin-competition-induced fitness cost (through either among-sibling competition or offspring depreciation), making two parents typically the preferred evolutionary outcome to three. Noting the inclusive fitness cost of among-sibling competition for breeding vacancies, Poiani (1994) suggests sibling dominance will facilitate the evolution of helping. We suggest that offspring depreciation will undermine this effect.
To summarize, we have shown the sensitivity of model predictions to the form of kin competition. Consequently, though explicit consideration of individual-level fitness effects is complex, simplifications may come at the expense of accuracy, generality or both. Further, we know from kin-directed hostility in queuing systems (e.g. Mumme et al. 1983; Hoogland 1985) that kin selection need not be universally beneficent. Offspring depreciation is likely to be at least part of the reason for this. The resulting dispersal dimorphism profoundly affects both predicted habitat use patterns and reproductive strategies in kin groups.
